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Heller, High Water(mark)?
Lower Courts and the New Right to Keep and
Bear Arms
Brannon P. Denning*
Glenn H. Reynolds**

Introduction
Nearly one year after the Supreme Court handed down its decision
1
in District of Columbia v. Heller, lower courts have had a number of
opportunities to apply it in challenges to a myriad of federal and state
gun control laws. In earlier articles, we predicted that the true test of
2
Heller’s robustness would be in its reception by the lower courts. The
cool reception to prior “landmark” Court decisions, however, left us
skeptical of how large an impact a single Supreme Court decision might
3
make. After reviewing lower court interpretations of Heller, our
skepticism appears to have been warranted: courts have not rushed to
overturn the federal gun laws that, hypothetically, were vulnerable
following the Court’s decision that the Second Amendment guaranteed
* Professor and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University.
** Beauchamp Brogan Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
We thank Professor Calvin Massey and the staff of the Hastings Law Journal, especially Henry Cheng,
for the kind invitation to participate in this Symposium and for the wonderful hospitality. Thanks, too,
to Eugene Volokh, who read an earlier draft and made valuable suggestions. Our initial draft cited
cases decided as of February 1, 2009. We have supplemented those cases with a few decided after that
date, but owing to the publication schedule, we were unable to incorporate all cases decided after our
February 1 cutoff date. For another discussion of post-Heller case law, see Adam Winkler, Heller’s
Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551 (2009).
1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
2. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 102 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 2035, 2038–43 (2008) [hereinafter Reynolds & Denning, Heller’s Future]; see also Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 671,
688–93 (2008) [hereinafter Denning & Reynolds, Five Takes] (discussing the significance of the lower
courts’ implementation of Heller).
3. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce
Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1253, 1262–99 (2003) [hereinafter
Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance]; Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower
Court Readings of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody
Came?, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 369, 392–99 [hereinafter Reynolds & Denning, Lower Court Readings].
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an individual right to private gun ownership. Most courts, dutifully
following dicta in Heller itself, have concluded that regulations short of
absolute bans or that ban ownership for discrete classes of persons pass
muster.
But it would be a mistake to conclude that Heller changed nothing.
While no federal gun control laws are in serious danger, numerous state
and local laws are—like the District of Columbia’s—more draconian. As
those cases wend their way through the lower courts, those state and
local governments find themselves legislating in Heller’s shadow; some
have even preemptively repealed their bans, replacing them with
4
something less stringent. State courts, moreover, are issuing opinions on
the merits of Second Amendment challenges to state and local gun laws
in advance of a Supreme Court decision formally incorporating the
5
Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. This suggests to us
that judges are internalizing the fundamental—or at least the
individual—nature of the right to keep and bear arms.
And though the federal courts are not striking down federal laws
directly, they too are adjudicating in the shadow of Heller. Now that the
right to keep and bear arms is a recognized individual right, due process
6
protections attach, with implications for at least one existing statute. In
addition, some evidence exists that courts will employ the canon of
avoidance in construing gun laws, interpreting statutes so as to avoid
7
conflicts with the Second Amendment. We describe these developments,
and use this preliminary data, to refine our earlier predictions about the
likely significance of Heller for constitutional law.
In Part I, we briefly review the predictions we hazarded about
Heller’s likely reception in the lower courts. In Part II, we describe how,
in Heller’s first year, federal and state courts have nearly unanimously
rejected constitutional challenges to various gun control regulations—
especially regulations that fall within the categories Justice Scalia flagged
as presumptively constitutional in the majority opinion—often with little
or minimal analysis. That is the bad news. In Part III, however, we note
that there is evidence that Heller’s unequivocal declaration that the
Second Amendment guarantees an individual right is having some
impact, not only in the courts, but, perhaps more importantly, on
nonjudicial actors. Following Heller, gun control policies—even at the
state and local level—will be made in the shadow of the Second
Amendment. A brief conclusion follows.

4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 102–11, 119–23 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 112–23 and accompanying text.
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I. HELLER and the Lower Courts: Early Predictions
In our earlier article, we wondered whether Heller would suffer the
8
9
same fate as Lopez and Morrison, or whether it would end up being
10
enforced more robustly by lower court judges. We identified a number
of factors that made us skeptical: (1) “the institutional prejudices of”
lower courts, whose judges want to clear their dockets of troublesome
11
cases and not encourage their proliferation; (2) the fact that Heller itself
12
seemed to signal that lower courts should not go hog-wild with Heller;
(3) ambiguity regarding the standard of review that made it difficult to
13
police lower court evasion; and (4) the inapplicability of Heller to state
and local gun control regimes, since even after Heller the Amendment
14
remained unincorporated. On the other hand, we suggested that public
engagement with the issue and the ability of well-funded interest groups
to bring good cases might increase the costs to federal judges of foot15
dragging or evasion. As we argue in the remainder of this Article, the
early evidence is mixed. While few laws have actually been struck down
or even called into question, courts do seem to understand Heller as a
break with the past—how decisive a break, though, is not yet clear.
II. Lower Courts and the HELLER Safe Harbor
Justice Scalia’s opinion seemed to anticipate—and seemed inclined
to head off—a number of challenges to federal gun control laws that
might have looked vulnerable in light of Heller. He wrote:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
16
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

For good measure, he added that his list of “presumptively lawful
17
regulatory measures . . . does not purport to be exhaustive.” Later in the
opinion, he seemed to add weapons deemed dangerous or highly unusual
18
to this list. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the basis for excluding
8. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. Reynolds & Denning, Heller’s Future, supra note 2, at 2039 (“Will Heller suffer Lopez’s fate,
serving more as casebook fodder than as actual authority?”).
11. Id.
12. Id.; see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008) (listing presumptively
constitutional restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms).
13. Reynolds & Denning, Heller’s Future, supra note 2, at 2039–40.
14. Id. at 2040.
15. Id. at 2040–41.
16. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
17. Id. at 2817 n.26.
18. Id. at 2817 (“Miller said . . . that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at
the time.’ We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the
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19

these classes of laws was not clear. As we discuss in this Part, lower
court judges have employed Justice Scalia’s categorical exclusions—
which we refer to collectively as the “Heller safe harbor”—with gusto,
expanding them in some cases.
A. Longstanding Prohibitions on Possession by Felons and the
Mentally Ill
A long list of persons prohibited from possessing firearms is found at
20
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). By far, the most common challenges following Heller
are those brought by felons convicted of violating § 922(g)(1), which
21
prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons. The typical
defendant is, as one court colorfully put it, “one of many charged or
convicted persons who believe that the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in [Heller] means that no one in possession of a firearm can be
convicted of a crime, whatever the kind of gun and whatever the status of
22
the person possessing it. They are wrong.” Relying on Justice Scalia’s
language in Heller, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh
23
Circuits, along with all the district courts who have addressed the issue
24
to date, have concluded that “Heller . . . was not intended to open the

carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” (citation omitted)).
19. Id. at 2869–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 1371
(2009). We have elsewhere suggested that Heller constitutionalized the popular understanding of the
Second Amendment—that it guaranteed an individual right but permitted “reasonable” regulation—
and enforced it against an outlier government whose laws were tantamount to a ban on all private gun
ownership. Denning & Reynolds, Five Takes, supra note 2, at 675–78. Justice Scalia has been harshly
criticized for his categorical exclusions. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343 (2009).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). Indeed, one recent decision described the statute’s scope as
“strikingly large” and “that [it] might be arguably called into question by a fair reading of Heller’s
rationale.” United States v. Abner, No. 3:08cr51, 2009 WL 103172, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 14, 2009).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
22. United States v. Kilgore, No. 08-cr-66, 2008 WL 4058020, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 2008)
(order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
23. See Triplett v. Roy, No. 08-40904, 2009 WL 1154892, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2009) (per
curiam) (“In Heller, the Court specifically noted that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon did
not fall within the protection of the Second Amendment right to bear arms.”); United States v. Brye,
No. 08-12578, 2009 WL 637553, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 13, 2009); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d
348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(characterizing the Court as having “recently upheld the ‘longstanding prohibition on the possession
of firearms by felons’”); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam);
United States v. Frazier, No. 07-6135, 2008 WL 4949153, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2008) (rejecting
constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)); see also United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL
82715, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (per curiam) (rejecting challenge based on Heller to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(4)’s prohibition on possession of weapons by mental patients).
24. See United States v. Miller, No. CR 108-122, 2008 WL 5170440, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 9, 2008)
(order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); Holter v. United States, Nos. 2:05-cr-12, 2:08-cv-100,
2008 WL 5100846, at *1 (D.N.D. Dec. 1, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss under 28
U.S.C. § 2255); United States v. Baron, Nos. CR-06-2095, CV-08-3048, 2008 WL 5102307, at *2 (E.D.
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door to a raft of Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)
25
convictions.” Nor have courts been inclined to distinguish between
26
violent and nonviolent felons. Courts are even beginning to rule that it

Wash. Nov. 25, 2008) (order denying defendant’s § 2255 motion); United States v. Borgo, No.
1:08CR81, 2008 WL 4631422, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss); United States v. Battle, No. 2:07-cr-307, 2008 WL 4571560, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 2008)
(order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); Lineberry v. United States, No. 5:08cv136, 2008 WL
4542882, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2008) (order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); United
States v. Whisnant, No. 3:07-CR-32, 2008 WL 4500118, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2008) (order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss) (“The Heller decision expressly recognizes that felon in
possession laws are valid limitations to the Second Amendment, and the Heller decision does not
change the constitutionality of the statutes that Defendant challenges in his motion to dismiss.”);
United States v. Westry, No. 08-20237, 2008 WL 4225541, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2008) (order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); Tate v. United States, Nos. 08-C-0440, 06-CR-321, 2008 WL
4104027, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 4, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion for a certificate of
appealability); Doshier v. Roy, No. 5:08cv133, 2008 WL 4148251, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008)
(order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); United States v. LePage, Nos. 08-cv-363, 05-cr-147,
2008 WL 4058523, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 26, 2008) (order denying defendant’s § 2255 motion); United
States v. Burris, No. 1:07cr76, 2008 WL 4000635, at *1–2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 26, 2008) (order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss); Triplett v. Roy, No. 5:08cv123, 2008 WL 4056564, at *1–2 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 2008) (order denying petition for writ of habeas corpus); United States v. Loveland, No.
1:08CR54, 2008 WL 3925271, at *1–2 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 21, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss); United States v. Singletary, No. 5:08-CR-12, 2008 WL 3843517, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 11,
2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss) (“Heller does not draw into question the
constitutionality of the felon in possession statute. Not only did the majority in [sic] make it clear that
its decision did not affect the constitutional validity of the felon in possession statute, but all courts
that have considered the issue since the Heller decision have reached the same conclusion as this court:
the felon in possession statute does not violate the Second Amendment.”) United States v. Henry, No.
08-20095, 2008 WL 3285842, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss) (“Given the clear pronouncement by the Heller majority, the Court declines Defendant’s
invitation to adopt the minority’s position and overrule the United States Supreme Court.”); United
States v. Hall, No. 2:08-00006, 2008 WL 3097558, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 2008) (order denying
defendant’s motion to suppress); United States v. Woodington, No. 07-CR-222, 2008 WL 2915420, at
*1 (E.D. Wis. July 25, 2008) (order and recommendation of magistrate judge that defendant’s motion
to dismiss be denied); United States v. Robinson, No. 07-CR-202, 2008 WL 2937742, at *2 (E.D. Wis.
July 23, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motions to withdraw his plea and to dismiss) (noting
defendant’s argument that the exclusionary language was dicta, but commenting that “I cannot so
quickly dismiss this explicit limitation on the Court’s holding.”); see also Minotti v. Whitehead, 584 F.
Supp. 2d 750, 760 n.12 (D. Md. 2008) (rejecting reliance on Heller for claim of impropriety in the
Bureau of Prisons’ exclusion from eligibility for one-year sentence reduction for completion of drug
rehabilitation program for those convicted of felony involving firearm, and stating that “the firearm
was in [defendant’s] car, while the focus of the decision in Heller was on the inherent right of selfdefense central to the Second Amendment in the context of defense one’s home”).
25. Baron, 2008 WL 5102307, at *2.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, No. 1:08-CR-75, 2009 WL 35225, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5,
2009) (denying motion to dismiss felon-in-possession indictment where felony was failure to pay child
support required by state law) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Heller was not casting doubt on the
constitutional validity of laws banning the possession of firearms by felons. This Court can only follow
that clear, unambiguous instruction . . . .”); Westry, 2008 WL 4225541, at *2 (rejecting arguments the
court should distinguish between violent and nonviolent felonies, noting that Heller did not mention
such a distinction). But for history, one wonders whether a law on firearms possession by nonviolent
felons could pass heightened scrutiny, which is probably why lower courts were grateful for Heller’s
sweeping approval of felon-in-possession bans.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1455989

DENNING_22 (J. Curiale)

1250

8/1/2009 1:05 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1245

is not ineffective assistance of counsel to refuse to raise a constitutional
27
challenge to the felon-in-possession statute. State courts, too, are
28
rejecting similar challenges to bars on felons possessing firearms, with
one state court of appeals opining that such a ban would even survive
29
strict scrutiny.
Courts have also rejected challenges, often without much analysis,
from other disqualified persons by analogy to felons and the mentally ill.
For example, the Lautenberg Amendment, passed in 1996, bars persons
convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from possessing
30
firearms. A separate provision prohibits those subject to a domestic
order of protection from possessing firearms as long as the order is in
31
effect. Neither provision was specifically mentioned by the Heller
27. See, e.g., LePage, 2008 WL 4058523, at *2 (also rejecting ineffective assistance claim).
28. See, e.g., State v. Rosch, No. 59703-5, 2008 WL 4120052, at *4 n.6 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 8,
2008) (upholding state felon-in-possession law under state constitution, and noting that Heller stated
felon-in-possession laws are presumptively constitutional).
29. State v. Hunter, 195 P.3d 556, 563 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting a challenge to state ban on
possession of firearms by felony sex offenders; concluding that such a law could even survive strict
scrutiny, assuming that the Second Amendment applies to the states: “[B]ecause it imposes permanent
firearm restrictions only on that class of criminals that the legislature has deemed to be the most
dangerous . . . the statutory scheme addresses a legitimate governmental interest (protecting the public
by precluding felons from possessing firearms) and is narrowly tailored (the lifetime ban applies only
to the most dangerous of those felons, as defined by the legislature). This meets the ‘strict scrutiny’
test.”).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). For more on the history of the Lautenberg Amendment, see
John M. Skakun III, Comment, Violence and Contact: Interpreting “Physical Force” in the Lautenberg
Amendment, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1833, 1834–39 (2008). Several cases have rejected challenges to
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 162–65 (D. Me. 2008);
United States v. Li, No. 08-CR-212, 2008 WL 4610318, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2008) (order denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss); United States v. Chester, No. 2:08-00105, 2008 WL 4534210, at *2
(S.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, and concluding that the statute
“survives Second Amendment scrutiny, whether deemed intermediate or strict, both facially and as
here applied”); United States v. Skoien, No. 08-cr-12, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 27,
2008) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, assuming that § 922(g)(9) would satisfy strict scrutiny,
and finding that persons found guilty of domestic violence “have shown that it is they and not any
outside intruders that pose the greater danger to their families”); United States v. White, No. 0700361, 2008 WL 3211298, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss);
see also Range v. Indiana, No. 3:08CV-435, 2008 WL 4852679, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 6, 2008) (rejecting
challenge to state statute prohibiting one convicted of domestic battery from carrying handgun
without a license); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 806–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding state
ban on firearms possession by one convicted of misdemeanor assault).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Several cases have considered challenges to this statute. See, e.g.,
United States v. Luedtke, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023–24 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (rejecting challenge); United
States v. Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (D. Me. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for
falsely answering a question on a form about being subject to order of protection, the court found that
“[r]educing domestic violence is a compelling governmental interest . . . and [§] 922(g)(8)’s temporary
prohibition, while the state court order is outstanding, is narrowly tailored to that compelling
interest”); United States v. Lippman, No. 4:02-cr-082, 2008 WL 4661514, at *2 (D.N.D. Oct. 20, 2008)
(rejecting the defendant’s challenge to his conviction on the basis of improper entry of the order of
protection that gave rise to his conviction); United States v. Erwin, No. 1:07-CR-556, 2008 WL
4534058, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (denying defendant’s motions to dismiss and suppress, and
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Court, and neither is much of a “longstanding” prohibition. Nevertheless,
32
no court has had much trouble rejecting challenges to those provisions.
To be fair, several of the court decisions are not as dismissive as those
involving the ban on possession by felons. Courts mention, for example,
that the ban is more narrowly drawn, focusing as it does on those who
have committed a violent crime, as opposed to the felon-in-possession
33
ban, which makes no such distinction. As a Maine district judge noted,
“[i]f anything, as a predictor of firearm misuse, the definitional net cast
34
by § 922(g)(9) is tighter than the net cast by § 922(g)(1).” Those courts
that bothered with applying any standard of review took it for granted
that reducing domestic violence would qualify as a compelling
governmental interest, and felt that barring possession was narrowly
35
tailored to that interest. Thus those statutes, one court concluded,
“survive[] Second Amendment scrutiny, whether deemed intermediate
36
or strict.”
And one may add drug dealers to the list of individuals whose
Second Amendment challenges to various federal laws have been
uniformly rejected by the courts. There are a number of statutes that
37
penalize mixing guns and drugs. Those who unlawfully use or are
addicted to controlled substances, for example, are barred from
38
possessing firearms. In other cases, penalties for drug trafficking are
39
enhanced if a gun is used in connection with those crimes. One court
termed the ban on possession by illegal drug users as another example of
a longstanding prohibition on firearm possession that Heller permits,
adding that “[n]othing in Heller restricts the federal government from
criminalizing the possession of firearms by unlawful users of controlled

holding that ban was narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest; noting that ban was
temporary).
32. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he manifest need to protect victims of domestic violence and to keep guns
from the hands of people who perpetuate such acts is well-documented and requires no further
elaboration.”); Knight, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 226 (“Reducing domestic violence is a compelling
government interest . . . and [§] 922(g)(8)’s temporary prohibition, while the state court order is
outstanding, is narrowly tailored to that compelling interest.”); Skoien, 2008 WL 4682598, at *1
(“These persons have shown that it is they and not any outside intruders that pose the greater dangers
to their families.”).
36. Chester, 2008 WL 4534210, at *2.
37. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(3), (g)(3), (q)(1)–(2), 924(c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
38. Id. § 922(g)(3).
39. See, e.g., id. § 924(c); see also id. § 924(j) (increasing penalties for gun crime in connection
with violation of § 924(c)); United States v. Williams, No. CR-05-920, 2008 WL 4644830, at *8 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 15, 2008) (order denying defendant’s motion to preclude capital prosecution) (“The Second
Amendment right to bear arms . . . does not make 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c),(j), unconstitutional because
[they] constitute reasonable limitations on Defendant’s Second Amendment rights.”).
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40

substances.” Another judge distinguished Heller, stating that the
decision “does not deal with statutes prohibiting possession or use of
41
firearms in connection with criminal behavior.” Other courts upheld the
enhanced penalties for firearm use in the course of drug crimes by simply
expanding the “well-rooted, public-safety-based exceptions to the
Second Amendment right that appear consistent with Congress’
determination that those unlawfully using or addicted to controlled
42
substances should not have firearms at the ready.”
B. Laws Forbidding the Carrying of Firearms in Sensitive Places
Justice Scalia mentioned schools and government buildings
43
specifically as part of the Heller safe harbor. Not surprisingly, then,
44
challenges to the Gun Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”) and to
regulations prohibiting the possession of firearms on the grounds of the
45
Post Office, have been rejected. A Virgin Islands district court held
emphatically that “Heller unambiguously forecloses a Second

40. United States v. Yancey, No. 08-cr-103, 2008 WL 4534201, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 3, 2008)
(order denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
41. Angelos v. United States, Nos. 2:07-CV-936, 2:02-CR-708, 2008 WL 5156602, at *8 n.19 (D.
Utah Dec. 8, 2008) (order denying defendant’s § 2255 motion).
42. United States v. Chafin, No. 2:08-000129, 2008 WL 4951028, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Nov. 18, 2008)
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss and rejecting a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), which
penalizes false statements made in connection with firearms purchase, as applied to an illegal
marijuana user). The Chafin court also distinguished Heller on the ground that “the Supreme Court
addressed only the constitutionality of a sweeping District of Columbia firearm regulation—one that
included a total ban on handguns—that was far more restrictive than the statutes allegedly violated.”
Id.; see also United States v. Rhodes, No. 08-4161, 2009 WL 990579, at *7 n.3 (4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2009)
(rejecting argument that weapon enhancement for sentence of defendant convicted of conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine did not violate the Second Amendment); United States v. Jackson,
555 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which
prohibits possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, and stating that“[t]he
Constitution does not give any the right to be armed while committing a felony”); United States v.
Bowers, No. 8:05CR294, 2008 WL 5396630, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 23, 2008) (“Nothing in the Heller
decision prohibits the Court from considering possession of a gun in connection with another crime in
determining what the appropriate sentence for the offense conduct should be. . . . Even if the
defendant had a permit for the ownership of this gun, it would not prohibit the Court from considering
the possession of that gun in connection with the crime charged in fashioning an appropriate sentence
for the defendant.”); United States v. Heredia-Mendoza, No. CR08-5125, 2008 WL 4951051, at *1–2
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2008) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 924
(c)(1)(A)); United States v. Potter, No. CR07-5683, 2008 WL 4779744, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31,
2008) (same).
43. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A); United States v. Lewis, No. 2008-45, 2008 WL 5412013, at *2
(D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008) (rejecting a challenge to the GFSZA and denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss); United States v. Walters, No. 2008-31, 2008 WL 2740398, at *1 n.1 (D.V.I. July 15, 2008)
(rejecting, on strength of pre-Heller case, a challenge to the GFSZA, and reciting that Heller does not
constitute an “unfettered” right to keep and bear arms).
45. United States v. Dorosan, No. 08-042, 2008 WL 2622996, at *6 (E.D. La. June 30, 2008) (order
denying defendant’s motion to dismiss).
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Amendment challenge to [the GFSZA] under any level of scrutiny.” In
the case of the Post Office regulations, the court noted that the
restrictions were—again in contrast with the District of Columbia’s gun
ban at issue in Heller—narrowly drawn to foster workplace safety, which
47
was again assumed to be of great governmental importance. And
though they were not mentioned specifically in Heller, one New York
48
court added airports to the “sensitive places” list. While one could
readily agree with that addition, the conclusion of a California court that
a private drive was a “sensitive place,” thus bringing a conviction for
49
carrying a concealed weapon under the Heller safe harbor, seems a
stretch.
C. Laws Imposing Conditions on the Sale of Arms
50
Federal law imposes numerous restrictions on the sale of arms,
51
including a federal firearms licensing regime and import restrictions on
52
certain weapons. Recently, the government has attempted to interdict
so-called “straw purchases,” where disqualified persons use a cut-out to
53
make an otherwise lawful purchase on their behalf. Federal law also
54
prohibits the purchase of stolen weapons, and “untraceable” weapons,
55
like those with obliterated serial numbers. The handful of challenges

46. Lewis, 2008 WL 5412013, at *3. As Eugene Volokh points out in his article, however, the gun
in Lewis, though within a school “zone,” was not possessed by the defendant on school grounds; it was
apparently in his car, which was within the requisite number of feet from the school. See Eugene
Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework
and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1528 n.345 (2009). We thank Eugene for bringing this
to our attention.
47. Dorosan, 2008 WL 2622996, at *6 (concluding that Heller does not require invalidation of
CFR § 232.1(1), which prohibits possession of firearms on postal facility property without official
purpose, and stating that “[t]he ban at issue does not affect the right of all individuals to bear arms at
home or traveling in a vehicle to and from work through high crime areas. It does not extend beyond
the noticed, gated confines of United States Postal Services’ property. It is narrowly tailored to effect
public and workplace safety solely on postal property . . . .”).
48. New York v. Ferguson, No. 2008QN036911, 2008 WL 4694552, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Oct. 24,
2008) (denying motion to dismiss indictment for carrying gun in airport, in part because Heller
“identified certain presumptively lawful regulatory measures which would survive a constitutional
challenge including the carrying of firearms in ‘sensitive places.’ Licensing is an acceptable regulatory
measure and an airport falls within the scope of a ‘sensitive place.”).
49. People v. Yarbrough, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674, 682–83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting challenge to
conviction for carrying concealed weapon, and stating that “[t]reating as criminal defendant’s
concealment of a firearm under his clothing on a residential driveway that was not closed off from the
public and was populated with temporary occupants falls within the ‘historical tradition’ of prohibiting
the carrying of dangerous weapons in publicly sensitive places”).
50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922–923 (2006 & Supp. 2008).
51. See id. § 923.
52. See, e.g., id. § 922(a)(4), (a)(7), (p), (o).
53. Id. § 922(a)(6).
54. Id. § 922(j).
55. Id. § 922(k).
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56

brought here have given courts little pause, with one court not even
bothering to discuss Heller itself, relying instead on pre-Heller case law
57
that rejected the individual right reading of the Second Amendment.
As the court pointed out in United States v. Marzzarella, though, the
ban on possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers is much
58
narrower than the law in Heller. In addition, the court found that “[t]he
Defendant’s possession of a firearm in connection with its private sale to
another is inherently inconsistent with an intention to possess the firearm
for defense of the Defendant’s home, since the Defendant cannot protect
59
himself with a weapon that he sells away.” The court added that
“untraceable firearms are of no particular use to the ordinary lawabiding citizen who intends to possess the firearm for common lawful
purposes (such as defense of hearth and home). Rather, such weapons
hold special value only for those individuals who intend to use them for
60
unlawful activity.”
The Marzzarella court took some pains to parse Heller, and rejected
the defendant’s argument that strict scrutiny applied, stating that the
categorical exclusions like those in the Heller safe harbor were
61
inconsistent with strict scrutiny, and that the restrictions—like the ban
at issue—functioned more like content-neutral “time, place, and
62
manner” restrictions on speech. Whatever the validity of the analogy,
the judge did not simply dismiss the defendant’s challenge out of hand.
Likewise, a Texas district court, rejecting a challenge to the ban on
straw purchases, adopted intermediate scrutiny, concluding that “the

56. See United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 597–600 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (rejecting
challenge to ban on possession of weapon with obliterated serial numbers); LaRoche v. United States,
Nos. CV 407-54, CR 402-234, 2008 WL 4222081, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2008) (rejecting challenge to
18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and denying defendant’s § 2255 motion); United States v. Bledsoe, No. 8A-08-CR13(2), 2008 WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2008) (rejecting challenge to straw-purchase ban
and denying defendant’s motion to dismiss); Mullinex v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, No. 5:07-CV-154, 2008 WL 2620175, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 2, 2008) (rejecting challenge to
import restrictions as applied to plaintiff’s efforts to import a World War II–era German machine
gun).
57. United States v. Lewis, No. 2008-21, 2008 WL 2625633, at *1 (D.V.I. July 3, 2008) (denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss and rejecting challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), under Heller, based on
pre-Heller precedent that denied individual right).
58. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d. at 599–600.
59. Id. at 600.
60. Id. at 602–03.
61. Id. at 604–06. This is not quite true. The Supreme Court’s First Amendment doctrine, while
applying strict scrutiny to content-based restrictions on speech, also contains content-based exclusions
(incitement, obscenity, etc.) that are excluded from the scope of the First Amendment because of their
content. See generally Calvin Massey, American Constitutional Law: Powers and Liberties 790
(3d ed. 2009) (“[S]ome categories of speech—defined by the content of the speech—are treated as
unprotected by the free speech guarantee. This seeming paradox comes about because the Court has
concluded that the societal interest in suppressing such speech outweighs the value of the speech.”).
62. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d. at 605–06.
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public safety concerns discussed in the Court’s previous order constitute
important governmental objectives and, furthermore, that the statutes
challenged by Defendant are substantially related to addressing those
63
ends.” Specifically, the court argued that “[t]o assert . . . that regulations
governing the sale of handguns for the 18–20 year-old age group do not
further a substantial governmental interest is meritless, given the
statistics suggesting that the vast majority of guns confiscated from 18–20
year old criminal defendants are handguns” and given the fact that “the
likely reason Congress passed the statute was to reduce handgun use in
64
the commission of crimes in the United States.”
D. Prohibitions of Dangerous and Unusual Weapons
One of the surprising filings during the Heller litigation was the
government’s brief, which urged reversal of the court of appeals’
decision, and recommended that the Supreme Court remand the case for
65
reconsideration using intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review.
Commentators have speculated that the Bush Administration’s position
66
was crafted to safeguard the federal ban on machine gun possession.
63. United States v. Bledsoe, No. 8A-08-CR-13(2), 2008 WL 3538717, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 8,
2008).
64. Id.
65. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.
Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 157201, at *8 (summarizing the Bush Administration’s
argument); see also Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional Scholarship and
District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 789, 789–90 (2008) (briefly describing the controversy
over the Bush Administration’s amicus brief).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2006); see, e.g., Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After
District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. Va. L. Rev. 349, 362 (2009). The Court’s own treatment of the
issue, aside from announcing the presumptive ability to regulate “dangerous and unusual weapons,” is
interesting:
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles
and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached
from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of
the Second Amendment’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military
service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia
duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th
century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large.
Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day
bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit
between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of
the right.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. Justice Scalia seemed to be saying that the linkage between the “arms” and
the reason for which arms were guaranteed—i.e., to enable the militia to serve as a military
counterweight to government soldiers—need not stay constant over time; that the armed citizenry is
not constitutionally guaranteed the means to be an effective military counterweight. At the time of the
Framing, rifles and pistols were common (not “dangerous and unusual”) and the common weaponry
of militia members, as well as useful for self-defense. Id. But that does not guarantee that all arms in
common use by modern military units are protected. Now that such arms are considered “dangerous
and unusual,” they are presumptively subject to regulation by the government, even if—vis-à-vis
government soldiers—the counterweight thus becomes less effective. Clearly the stress of Heller is on
individual, as opposed to collective, self-defense.
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Two early decisions concerning machine guns involved defendants
who wished to argue to the jury their belief that the Second Amendment
67
guaranteed their right to own machine guns. In one, United States v.
Gilbert, the defendant was not allowed to testify as to his belief in the
68
Second Amendment’s scope. The defendant complained that the judge
both issued a jury instruction saying that the defendant did not possess
that right and rejected the defendant’s jury instruction that tracked the
69
testimony he unsuccessfully sought to give in court. The Ninth Circuit
rejected his argument in a single sentence: “Under Heller, individuals still
do not have the right to possess machineguns or shortbarreled
rifles . . . and convicted felons . . . do not have the right to possess any
70
firearms.”
The defendant in United States v. Fincher fared no better in the
71
Eighth Circuit. Adding insult to injury, that panel really decided the
case under pre-Heller case law that rejected the individual right theory of
72
the Second Amendment. Specifically, the court held that, contrary to
the defendant’s argument, prior case law had not created an affirmative
defense to the ban on machine gun possession where possession of the
machine gun was reasonably related to the maintenance of a well73
regulated militia.
Upholding his conviction, the court said that it had “taken into
account [the Heller decision],” but noted (1) that the Supreme Court also
held that “the right to possess firearms is not beyond the reach of all
government regulation,” and (2) the existence of the Heller safe harbor
74
for categories of weapons. It concluded: “Accordingly, under Heller,
Fincher’s possession of the guns is not protected by the Second
Amendment. Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of
dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for
75
76
individual use.” As they tend to do, other courts have seized upon

67. United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing how even if the defendant had claimed “an
individual right to possess a machine gun,” his possession is “not protected under Heller”).
68. 286 F. App’x at 386.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court also upheld the exclusion of the defendant’s testimony regarding his beliefs
about the Second Amendment’s scope. Id.
71. 538 F.3d at 870–71.
72. Id. at 872–74.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 873–74.
75. Id. at 874.
76. See generally, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted? Lower Court
Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the Second Amendment, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 961 (1996)
(discussing lower court interpretations of Miller).
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Fincher—and little else—in concluding that machine guns or other
“unusual” weapons are beyond the scope of the Second Amendment’s
78
79
right to keep and bear arms. At least one federal court relied on
language in Heller that seemed to indicate that state bans on the carrying
80
of concealed weapons would remain similarly undisturbed.
E. Incorporation and Challenges to State and Local Gun Laws
Given the District of Columbia’s unique status, the Court was able
81
to put the incorporation question to one side. And, so far, only the
Ninth Circuit has been willing to “underrule” the Court’s creaky
82
precedents that render the Second Amendment inapplicable to the

77. See United States v. Ross, No. 08-1120, 2009 WL 1111544, at *2 (3d Cir. Apr. 27, 2009)
(“Nothing in Heller supports Ross’s challenge to the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the
possession of a machine gun.”); Hamblen v. United States, No. 3:08-1034, 2008 WL 5136586, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 5, 2008) (“The conclusion that the Heller Court did not extend Second Amendment
protection to machine guns, in particular, is supported by the lower federal courts that have addressed
the issue.”); Salter v. Roy, No. 5:08-CV-145, 2008 WL 4588629, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2008) (order
denying petition for writ of habeas corpus) (“The Supreme Court did not find that possession of
machine guns is also protected by the Second Amendment.” (citing Fincher, 538 F.3d 868)).
78. See United States v. Perkins, No. 4:08CR3064, 2008 WL 4372821, at *4 (D. Neb. Sept. 23,
2008) (order denying defendant’s motions to dismiss and suppress) (“I have no doubt . . . that if
confronted with the issue, the Eighth Circuit would apply the same rationale as that applied in Fincher.
That is, silencer/suppressors ‘are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and
therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit
for individual use.’” (quoting Fincher, 538 F.3d at 874)).
79. Swait v. Univ. of Neb. at Omaha, No. 8:08CV404, 2008 WL 5083245, at *3 (D. Neb. Nov. 25,
2008) (order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend) (“[S]tates can prohibit the carrying
of a concealed weapon without violating the Second Amendment.”).
80. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816 (2008) (noting that nineteenth-century
commentators considered “prohibitions on concealed weapons” to be constitutional); see also Sims v.
United States, 963 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C. 2008) (refusing to reverse conviction for carrying unlicensed
handgun, possessing unregistered handgun and unlawful possession of ammunition under “clear error”
standard in light of Heller, where Second Amendment claims were not raised at trial, and stating that
“[i]mportant questions about the reach of Heller remain to be answered, but what assuredly is not
‘clear’ and ‘obvious’ from the decision is that it dictates an understanding of the Second Amendment
which would compel the District to license a resident to carry and possess a handgun outside the
confines of his home”).
81. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.
82. As this Article was in production, the Ninth Circuit decided Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439
(9th Cir. 2009), in which it held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “selective incorporation” decisions
support the incorporation of the Second Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment and its
application to the states. Surveying Founding-era history, and that surrounding the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court concluded that
the right to keep and bear arms is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition.’ . . . The crucial role this deeply rooted right has played in our birth and history
compels us to recognize that it is indeed fundamental, that it is necessary to the AngloAmerican conception of ordered liberty that we have inherited.
Id. at 457. It nevertheless went on to uphold a county ordinance prohibiting the possession of firearms
on county property, which prevented promoters from holding gun shows in Alameda County. Id. at
460 (“[T]he Ordinance does not meaningfully impede the ability of individuals to defend themselves in
their homes with usable firearms, the core of the right as Heller analyzed it.”).
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83

states. Rejecting a challenge to a state ban on nunchakus, for example,
the Second Circuit observed that Presser v. Illinois was good law until the
84
Supreme Court itself said otherwise. An Illinois district court went out
of its way to emphasize that stare decisis alone dictated the dismissal of a
suit challenging the gun control laws of a Chicago suburb: “This Court
should not be misunderstood as either rejecting or endorsing the logic of
plaintiffs’ argument, it may well carry the day before a court that is
unconstrained by the obligation to follow the unreversed precedent of a
85
court that occupies a higher position in the judicial firmament.”
While a few courts, acknowledging the lack of incorporation, have
proceeded to analyze gun laws under Heller anyway, no court to date has
indicated that, but for the lack of incorporation, many of these laws
86
would be vulnerable. In general, judges seem to share Judge Jack
83. See, e.g., Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). For a discussion of the incorporation
issue, see Denning & Reynolds, Five Takes, supra note 2, at 679–88; and Nelson Lund, Anticipating
Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role of Inferior Courts, 59 Syracuse L. Rev. 185, 191–99
(2008).
84. Maloney v. Cuomo, 554 F.3d 56, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Lewis, No.
2008-45, 2008 WL 5412013, at *5 (D.V.I. Dec. 24, 2008) (rejecting argument that Heller renders the
Second Amendment applicable to the Virgin Islands); People v. Abdullah, 870 N.Y.S.2d 886, 886–87
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008) (rejecting challenge on incorporation grounds).
85. NRA v. Oak Park, Nos. 08 C 3696, 08 C 3697, 2008 WL 5111163, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2008).
The judge in this case seemed to have a good time writing the opinion; he could not help but
characterize counsel who challenged the local law the morning Heller was announced as being “quick
on the trigger” and as having come “loaded for bear.” Id. at *1. Plaintiffs, in another challenge to a
Chicago suburb’s strict gun control laws, sought the recusal of Judge Marvin Aspen, who had once
penned an article in favor of national handgun control legislation, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). See NRA
v. Evanston, No. 08 C 3693, 2008 WL 3978293, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2008). Judge Aspen declined.
Id. at *6 (“While I disagreed with gun lobbyists opposing federal handgun legislation in 1976, no
reasonable person would be convinced by the Article that I am today prejudiced against these specific
plaintiffs with a bias so deep that it cannot be readily set aside to enable me to fairly judge the specific
issues presented in this litigation.”). The litigation was later mooted because Evanston amended its
gun-control ordinance. See NRA v. Evanston, No. 08 C 3693, 2008 WL 5070358, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
24, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, thus mooting a challenge to Evanston,
Illinois’ handgun ban where offending ordinance was amended to permit handgun possession for “selfprotection” where possessor had valid state Firearm Owner’s Identification card).
86. See, e.g., Bruley v. Vill. Green Mgmt. Co., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1381, 1387 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
(refusing to imply an exception to state employment at-will doctrine for use of a firearm at work
because “whatever Second Amendment right Bruley may have to possess a firearm in his apartment, it
cannot be stretched to create a wrongful discharge cause of action under Florida law against a private
employer which fires an employee for carrying a firearm on company property. Moreover, there is no
state action involved.” (footnote omitted)); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 806 n.4 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (noting that the Amendment has not been incorporated, but rendering a decision on the
merits anyway); In re Bastiani, 2208 N.Y. Slip Op. 28529, 2008 WL 5455690, at *3 (N.Y. County Ct.
Dec. 15, 2008) (rejecting challenge to state concealed-carry licensing scheme requiring showing of
“special need,” and stating: “Putting aside the question of whether the Second Amendment’s
‘individual’ right to bear arms is in fact extended to the individual states as a fundamental right . . . it is
clear that . . . a regulatory scheme would not run afoul of the Heller Court’s holding. . . . Reasonable
regulation of handgun possession survives the Heller decision.”). But see Alan Brownstein, The
Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism,
and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 Hastings L.J. 1205 (2009) (noting possible unintended
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Weinstein’s opinion that “[i]t cannot be concluded that Heller places in
doubt all state and local control of guns required to protect citizens,
87
particularly in urban communities.” Of course, Heller does not mean
that none are vulnerable either.

***
On the one hand, the foregoing seems to confirm our pessimistic
88
89
predictions about the effect of Heller. As was true following Lopez,
courts sometimes strain to distinguish the challenged law from the one
invalidated in Heller, with courts frequently remarking that this or that
challenged law sweeps much more narrowly than did the District of
90
Columbia’s ordinance. Similarly, one often sees little analysis—a
grudging acknowledgement of Heller as a new fact of life, quickly
91
followed by the conclusion that the case did not really change anything.
And while lower courts sometimes lament the lack of clarity in Heller
92
regarding, say, what the standard of review actually was, few judges
seem interested in figuring it out on their own.
And yet it seems that this is precisely what the Supreme Court
wanted. Political scientists and law professors alike have written
93
extensively on signaling and agenda-setting by the Supreme Court.
Despite being dicta—the issues mentioned were not before the Court
and were not necessary to resolve those that were before it—the Heller
safe harbor seems to us to have been a clear signal, clearer perhaps than
any sent in Lopez, that lower courts should not declare open season on

consequences for state and local law after Heller).
87. New York v. Bob Moates’ Sport Shop, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 237, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting
challenge to personal jurisdiction in nuisance suit against gun dealers alleged to facilitate illegal arms
purchases that ended up in New York, and adding that “[t]o transmutate Heller into an inhibition on
long standing ancient nuisance powers of the state to control nuisances, the power of the federal
government to regulate firearms that flow through the stream of interstate commerce, and the power
of the federal judiciary in diversity cases to enforce that state substantive law is almost
inconceivable”). For a characteristically thoughtful analysis of Heller and its application to a number
of gun-control laws in various contexts, including some addressed in this Part, see Volokh, supra note
46.
88. See supra notes 10–14 and accompanying text.
89. For examples, see Denning & Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance, supra note 3; and Reynolds
& Denning, Lower Court Readings, supra note 3.
90. See supra notes 33–34, 58–59 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 20–80 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809 n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“The majority
opinion in Heller provides little guidance with respect to how courts are to determine whether the
numerous firearm restrictions not explicitly addressed in the opinion should be evaluated in light of
the Second Amendment right recognized in that case. The parties in the instant case provide little
assistance.” (citation omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16
Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1, 1–17 (2008); see also Andrew P. Morriss et al., Signaling and Precedent in
Federal District Court Opinions, 13 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 63, 63–65, 96–97 (2005).
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any and all federal gun laws. It seems to us that the lower courts have
certainly heeded this signal.
If the Heller safe harbor was indeed intended as a signal to lower
courts (and litigants, perhaps), then it tends to confirm an earlier
observation we made about Heller: that it is another example of the
Court’s tendency to constitutionalize the national consensus on certain
94
hot button issues and then enforce it against outliers. Whether this is a
role that the Court ought to be undertaking is a subject for another day,
but the early returns from the lower courts ought at least to allay the
fears of those who foresaw a blizzard of cases coming, each potentially
95
undermining gun control laws at all levels of government.
The lack of lower court enforcement, though, might leave gun rights
advocates feeling cheated. After all, when you win in the Supreme Court,
that is supposed to mean something, right? Well, in the silver lining
department, we were somewhat surprised to see so many courts
acknowledge that the Second Amendment had not been incorporated,
96
then proceed to apply Heller anyway. Perhaps they would not have
done so had they not felt confident the measure would survive scrutiny;
on the other hand, it might simply reflect acceptance of the fact that
incorporation is a matter of time and that perhaps it would not be the
apocalypse if it occurred.
And there is more: In the next Part, we discuss some interesting
developments, both in and out of the courts, that suggest that the new
right to keep and bear arms may end up being more robust than the
decisions discussed above might have you believe. The recognition of an
individual right, we argue, has caused legislators and judges to render
decisions in Heller’s shadow, with some interesting results.

III. Legislation and Adjudication in the Shadow of HELLER
While Heller-based frontal assaults on firearms convictions have not
been particularly successful to date, this is not to say that Heller has not
influenced courts and legislators. With the recognition of firearms
possession as an enumerated constitutional right, courts are now
discovering that they must take notice of that fact in a number of

94. Denning & Reynolds, Five Takes, supra note 2, at 676–79.
95. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2846–47 (2008) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L.
Rev. 253, 321 (2009) (criticizing Heller, inter alia, on the ground that by constitutionalizing the guncontrol debate, the Court “subjects every state and local regulation to federal court review,” with the
consequence that “the national controversy over gun policy will intensify”). But see Nordyke v. King,
563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the Supreme Court’s selective-incorporation
jurisprudence compelled the Second Amendment’s incorporation).
96. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
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settings, sometimes—though far from always—to the benefit of
defendants.
In Heller, the Supreme Court recognized that possessing firearms,
including handguns, in the home for purposes of self-defense is protected
as part of the individual right to arms guaranteed by the Second
Amendment—a right that all nine Justices recognized as belonging to
97
individuals, rather than to the states. This has two effects that matter:
First, firearms possession now acquires the protections that go with a
constitutional right, even one whose scope remains less than fully
defined. Second, firearms possession is also normalized: post-Heller, it is
impossible to characterize gun ownership as an activity that is somehow
suspect, deviant, or marginal when it has been recognized as a
constitutional right. Both of these effects have turned out to make a
difference in cases already, and it seems likely that they will influence
future cases as well.
A. Legislative Responses
Immediately following the Heller decision, suits were filed against a
number of state and local governments whose gun laws were as strict, or
98
nearly so, as the District of Columbia’s. Absent incorporation, the suits
were clear losers, and yet, rather than defend them, some cities amended
their gun control ordinances, replacing what had been near-total bans on
99
handguns with licensing schemes. In San Francisco, the city settled a
lawsuit brought by the National Rifle Association and now permits
100
residents of San Francisco housing projects to possess arms. Tenant
leases previously had provisions “prohibiting the possession of guns and
101
ammunition.” Given the stress state and local budgets currently face as
a result of the economic downturn, more cities—and even some states—
might decide that discretion is the better part of valor, and amend
restrictive gun laws, rather than risk expensive lawsuits that they might
ultimately lose. No such hydraulic pressure to amend these laws,
however, would have been possible without the Heller decision.

97. Reynolds & Denning, Heller’s Future, supra note 2, at 2035 (“What Heller is most notable for
is its complete and unanimous rejection of the ‘collective rights’ interpretation [of the Amendment].”).
98. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Gun Advocates Armed for Legal Fight, L.A. Times, June 27, 2008, at
A19.
99. See, e.g., Deborah Horan & Brian Cox, Evanston Amends Its Gun-Ban Law; Supreme Court
Ruling, NRA Suit Force City Move, Chi. Trib., Aug. 12, 2008, Metro, at 2, available at http://
archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/aug/12/local/chi-evanston-gunaug12 (noting that both Evanston and
Morton Grove, Illinois repealed their handgun bans following Heller).
100. Bob Egelko, Housing Authority Settles Gun Lawsuit, S.F. Chron., Jan. 14, 2009, at B3,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/13/BALM15A1SG.DTL.
101. Id.
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B. The Adam Walsh Act
In 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
102
Safety Act, named for the murdered son of America’s Most Wanted
103
host John Walsh. The Adam Walsh Act imposed additional bail
requirements on those charged with possession of child pornography,
including a requirement that the accused “refrain from possessing a
104
firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon.” Since Heller,
this requirement has been treated differently in at least some federal
courts. In United States v. Kennedy, the defendant was arrested after his
laptop, examined upon his reentry to the United States at Seattle’s Sea105
Tac airport, was found to contain child pornography. Ultimately
charged with “transportation of child pornography,” he was subjected to
the automatic requirements of the Adam Walsh Act, including the
106
requirement that he refrain from possessing a firearm. The district
court found that without a particularized finding of danger on the part of
107
the defendant, such a requirement violated the Excessive Bail Clause
and made the following comment regarding Heller:
Pretrial Services recommends that Defendant be prohibited from
possessing a firearm, which is a mandatory condition under the Walsh
Act. In District of Columbia v. Heller, . . . the Supreme Court held that
the Second Amendment created an individual right to possess
firearms. . . . Justice Scalia noted that a law regulating a specific,
enumerated right such as the right to keep and bear arms was subject
to more than a rational basis level of scrutiny. If the government’s
position in this case is sustained, this constitutional right would be
taken away not because of a conviction, but merely because a person
was charged. This right would be lost notwithstanding a lack of
showing that Defendant is a potentially violent individual, or that he
even owns firearms. Certainly no particularized need has been
established in this case that the Defendant should prohibited [sic] from
108
possessing a firearm.

This requirement of a particularized showing of danger would seem
to undermine the automaticity of the Adam Walsh Act; such a
particularized showing in the Kennedy case would have been difficult, as
the court found that:
The Defendant is 31 years old and has lived in the Seattle area his
entire life, with the exception of 10 months in Vail, Colorado. He has

102. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
103. See Police: 1981 Killing of Adam Walsh Solved, MSNBC.com, Dec. 16, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28257294/.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (c)(1)(8)(viii) (2006).
105. 593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1223–24 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
106. Id. at 1224–25.
107. Id. at 1226–29.
108. Id. at 1231 n.4 (citations omitted).
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no prior record of criminal activity. Defendant has maintained regular,
gainful employment with the local Longshoreman’s Union, and he
109
began working with the Union when he was 18 years old.

Likewise, in United States v. Arzberger, the Southern District of
New York found Heller a bar to an automatic ban on firearms
110
possession. Judge James Francis wrote:
A year ago, I might well have taken for granted the authority of
Congress to require that a person charged with a crime be prohibited
from possessing a firearm as a condition of pretrial release. The Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . had [been] routinely
interpreted . . . as a right limited to the possession of weapons for
certain military purposes. . . .
This all changed with District of Columbia v. Heller. There, the
Court stated that “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both
text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms.” . . .
To the extent, then, that the Second Amendment creates an
individual right to possess a firearm unrelated to any military purpose,
it also establishes a protectible liberty interest. And, although the
Supreme Court has indicated that this privilege may be withdrawn
from some groups of persons such as convicted felons, there is no basis
for categorically depriving persons who are merely accused of certain
crimes of the right to legal possession of a firearm.
....
Accordingly, the Adam Walsh Amendments violate due process by
requiring that, as a condition of release on bail, an accused person be
required to surrender his Second Amendment right to possess a
firearm without giving that person an opportunity to contest whether
such a condition is reasonably necessary in his case to secure the safety
of the community. Because the Amendments do not permit an
individualized determination, they are unconstitutional on their face.
The Government’s application to impose as a condition of bail that Mr.
111
Arzberger not possess a firearm is therefore denied.

These cases suggest that, as an enumerated right, the right to possess
firearms is not something that can be withdrawn at legislative whim.
Rather, it is sufficiently important to trigger individualized due process
protections, and to be impaired only when there is an individualized risk
of firearms crime. (One suspects that the nexus between child
pornography possession and firearms crime is likely to be slight; certainly
these two cases do not suggest otherwise.)

109. Id. at 1225.
110. 592 F. Supp. 2d 590, 601–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
111. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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C. Sympathy for the Felon
As noted earlier, Heller has proven to be anything but a get-out-ofjail-free card for felons in possession of firearms. Nonetheless, even here
some federal courts are finding that the characterization of the right to
arms as an individual right affects their analysis, though, at this point, not
always sufficiently to get the accused off the hook. Nonetheless, the
discussion raises some interesting points.
In United States v. Kitsch, the defendant was in the anomalous
position of being unaware that he was a convicted felon; he was (or at
least claimed to be) under the impression that the conviction had been
112
expunged and, in fact, it had not shown up on a background check. In
discussing defendant’s motion to require the government to prove
scienter with regard to his status as a felon, the district court held:
In Heller, the Court found for the first time that the Second
Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and carry
weapons in case of confrontation.” The Court acknowledged that longstanding limitations on the ownership and use of weapons, including
Section 922(g)(1), were consistent with that guarantee. Nevertheless,
because the Constitution directly guarantees the right, such limitations
are subject to some level of increased scrutiny. . . .
A statute that imposes criminal penalties for the exercise of an
enumerated constitutional right despite defendant’s reasonable belief
in good faith that he has complied with the law must, at the very least,
raise constitutional doubts. Post-Heller, the Government’s desired
construction of Section 922(g)(1) imposes just such a burden on
defendants who, for whatever reason, reasonably believe that they are
not felons within the statutory definition. Faced with a statute that
raises this sort of doubt, it is “incumbent upon us to read the statute to
eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”
. . . Accordingly, we find that the word “knowingly” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2), when applied to the offense in 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1),
modifies both the elements of possession of the firearm and the status
as a convicted felon. We will therefore grant defendant’s motion as to
this issue and will instruct the jury that, in order to convict Kitsch, the
Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or
was willfully blind to the fact that he had a prior felony conviction that
113
had not been set aside or expunged.

Furthermore, in another felon-in-possession case, United States v.
Skeens, the defendant, a felon, was found to be in constructive possession
114
of a number of firearms nominally owned by his wife. The court did,
112. No. 03-594-01, 2008 WL 2971548, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2008).
113. Id. at *7 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64,
78 (1994)).
114. 589 F. Supp. 2d 757, 758 (W.D. Va. 2008).
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however, observe with regard to a firearm kept in the wife’s bedside
table that “[w]hile the Second Amendment does not immunize the
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, it does seem incongruous to
sentence Mr. Skeens more harshly in part because of his wife’s
115
constitutionally-protected possession of a firearm.” As forty-seven
other firearms were also involved, however, this made no difference to
116
the outcome.
Finally, in Jennings v. Mukasey, a defendant sought a declaratory
judgment that his right to possess firearms was not impaired by an
117
expunged conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence. In rejecting
the government’s motion to dismiss, the court observed:
Assuming, as the Court must at this stage in the proceedings, that
Plaintiff’s conviction was duly expunged, it seems that he would clearly
fall within the statutory exception in § 921(a)(33) (B)(ii) [sic] and
would not be subject to prosecution under § 922(g)(9). Furthermore,
in light of District of Columbia v. Heller, Plaintiff raises a viable claim
that the violation of his Second Amendment right to bear arms also
deprives him of the right to earn a livelihood. Taken together, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations fall within the very limited
exception to the general principle of immunity, that Plaintiff is
otherwise without an adequate remedy at law, and that Plaintiff would
suffer irreparable harm if not permitted to proceed in the instant
118
action.

These cases hardly represent a sea change in the constitutional law
of firearms possession. They do, however, indicate that lower courts are
taking cognizance of the Heller decision in a way that did not happen
with regard to such decisions as Lopez or Morrison. Though these are
not cases on all fours with Heller, the emergence of firearms possession
as an individual constitutional right has plainly entered into the courts’
consciousness and reasoning process; decisions on other topics are being
made in the shadow of Heller.
There is even some evidence that this is happening at the state level.
In Cleveland v. Fulton, the defendant, who had been charged with and
acquitted of various disorderly conduct offenses, sought return of his
119
seized handgun. The city, meanwhile, sought forfeiture on the ground
120
that an unregistered handgun was “contraband.” The Ohio Court of
Appeals held that:
Fulton’s handgun was not a legally banned handgun, nor was he
prohibited from owning or possessing it. The United States Supreme

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 759 n.3 (citation omitted).
See id. at 758 (affirming the guideline calculation formulated under the sentencing guidelines).
No. 6:08-cv-833-Orl-31GJK, 2008 WL 4371348, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2008).
Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
898 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 985.
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Court recently settled a long-standing debate as to the meaning of the
Second Amendment. The court [sic] made clear that the Second
Amendment, although not unfettered, guarantees the individual right
of every American to possess and carry weapons unconnected to
militia service.
This court certainly understands and shares the trial court’s concerns
about dangerous guns in our society and the damage and violence they
can cause. That does not entitle the city, however, to deprive a person
of his private property without due process of law.
Fulton’s unregistered handgun not being contraband per se, he was
entitled to have his property returned to him upon dismissal of the
121
charges.

The Fulton case demonstrates an important consequence of Heller’s
individual right holding: the normalization of firearms possession. In the
past sometimes treated as a deviant act, something not to be permitted
122
without the indulgence of the sovereign, firearms possession is now
something contemplated by the Constitution—something not deviant,
but normal, with the burden shifting from those who would possess
123
firearms to those who would deny their possession. This burden-shift
may turn out to be the most consequential result of Heller, at least in the
day-to-day work of state and federal courts.
D. The Future
Though concrete discussion will await a later installment of our postHeller survey, it seems possible that the shadow cast may be long enough
to affect interpretation of the right-to-arms provisions in state
constitutions. Although state constitutional interpretation is nominally—
and, in recent years, often actually—independent of federal
constitutional interpretation, there is no question that the United States
Supreme Court has a powerful influence over the thinking of state court
124
judges. Though in some cases state courts have interpreted their state
right-to-arms provisions more strongly than the Supreme Court has
125
interpreted the Second Amendment —just as, before Lawrence v.

121. Id. at 989.
122. For examples of the old attitude among federal judges, see generally Denning, supra note 76.
123. See supra notes 102–21 and accompanying text.
124. Indeed, the growing independence of state courts in state constitutional interpretation may
trace, in part, to the granting of “permission”—or at least encouragement—by Justice Brennan. See
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
489, 498–504 (1977) (calling for greater independence in state constitutional interpretation).
125. See, e.g., Stillwell v. Stillwell, No. E2001-00245-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 862620, at *4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. July 30, 2001) (striking down visitation order barring ex-husband from having guns in home
when children were present as violating right to arms). For further discussion, see Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Guns and Gay Sex: Some Notes on Firearms, The Second Amendment, and “Reasonable
Regulation,” 75 Tenn. L. Rev. 137, 143–46 (2007).
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126

Texas, some state courts protected rights to privacy under their state
constitutions more strongly than the United States Supreme Court did
127
under the Federal Constitution —it seems likely that many courts will
find pro–individual rights interpretations of state right-to-arms
provisions easier, or at least politically less threatening, post-Heller.
At this stage, it remains unclear how that will shake out. One
interesting aspect of the Heller decision is that—unlike Lopez or
Morrison—it addresses issues not strictly federal in nature. There is no
state analog to the enumerated powers doctrine, but the right to bear
arms remains very much alive among state courts. At present forty-four
128
states have right-to-arms provisions in their state constitutions,
provisions that have been enforced with varying degrees of enthusiasm
129
on the part of state judiciaries. Perhaps those states whose right-toarms provisions have been subject to lackluster enforcement will begin to
enforce them more vigorously; perhaps those states that have already
enforced their right-to-arms provisions with some degree of vigor will
begin to scrutinize legislation and regulation that trench on firearms
possession even more closely. Or, perhaps, protection at the federal level
will encourage state courts to slack off in their protection of state
constitutional rights.

Conclusion
As we write this Article, Heller remains less than a year old, and it is
surely too early to issue pronouncements regarding its legacy in the
lower courts. Nonetheless, it appears to us that—compared with our
experience following lower-court reactions to Lopez and Morrison—the
Heller decision is getting more early response from the lower courts than
either of those cases did. While the majority of invocations, as with those
earlier cases, come from the sort of hopeful felons who tend to get short
shrift from federal courts, not all responses have been dismissive, and
there appear to be a number of courts that are conscientiously
attempting to adjust their reasoning in light of new Supreme Court case
law.
In part, this may say something about our legal culture, which tends
to take positively enumerated individual rights more seriously than limits
on governmental power, a view which is something of a departure from
130
that which prevailed at the time of the framing. At any rate, both
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. See Reynolds, supra note 125 (comparing these lines of cases).
128. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rev. L. &
Pol. 191, 192–204 (2006).
129. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 125, at 138–43; Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second
Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 715–25 (2007).
130. See Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787, at 430–38, 547–
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courts and lawyers have a ready-made template, in the form of recent
history, for understanding judicial expansions of individual rights, a
template that is notably absent when it comes to internal limits on
government power.
Unlike the Commerce Clause cases, the Heller case also has analogs
in state constitutional law in the large majority of states that have their
own right-to-arms provisions, and it is likely to produce at least
something of a gravitational effect in state right-to-arms cases. It is even
131
possible that—as with other areas, such as sodomy laws —we will see
cross-fertilization and even competition among states and between the
states and the federal courts as this case law develops. It should, at any
rate, be fascinating to observe—which is a good thing, as we plan to
continue observing it.

64 (1969). For some more modern thoughts on structure in this context, see generally Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 1635 (1995).
131. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, State and Comparative Constitutional Law Perspectives on a
Possible Post-Roe World, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 685, 689 (2007) (noting that, before Lawrence v. Texas,
state courts in Georgia and Kentucky struck down sodomy laws under state constitutional provisions);
Reynolds, supra note 125, at 145 (making the same point about the Tennessee Court of Appeals).
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